Publications
Whether or not to open Pandora's box [Last updated: September 2017]. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 175, (May 2018),pp 127-158.
Working papers
Dynamically Stable Matching, [Last updated: June 2019]
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good, with Vasiliki Skreta [Last updated: April 2019]
On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets, with Balázs Szentes [Last updated: July 2019]
Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment, with Vasiliki Skreta [Last updated: May 2019], revision requested at Econometrica.
Sequential Information Design, with Jeff Ely [Last updated: April 2019]
Notes
Constrained Information Design: Toolkit, with Vasiliki Skreta [Last Updated: November 2018]
Work in Progress
The Value of Time: A High-Frequency Revealed Preference Analysis, with Nicholas Buchholz, Jakub Kastl, Filip Matejka, and Tobias Salz
Organ Allocation: A Mechanism Design Approach
Efficient Mechanisms for Liquidity Constrained Agents, with José Antonio Espín-Sánchez
Older working papers
(partly incorporated incorporated in later work)
A theory of stability in dynamic matching markets [Last updated: March 2018]
Dynamic and many-to-many matching [Last updated: May 2016]