Whether or not to open Pandora's box [Last updated: September 2017] (Forthcoming,  Journal of Economic Theory,Vol 175, (May 2018),pp 127-158)

Working papers

On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets, with Balázs Szentes [Last updated: April 2018]

Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment, with Vasiliki Skreta [Last updated: November 2018]

Sequential Information Design, with Jeff Ely [Last updated: August 2016]

A theory of stability in dynamic matching markets [Last updated: March 2018]

Dynamic and many-to-many matching [Last updated: May 2016]


Constrained Information Design: Toolkit, with Vasiliki Skreta [Last Updated: November 2018]

Work in Progress

The Value of Time: A High-Frequency Revealed Preference Analysis, with Nicholas Buchholz, Jakub Kastl, Filip Matejka, and Tobias Salz

Organ Allocation: A Mechanism Design Approach

Efficient Mechanisms for Liquidity Constrained Agents, with José Antonio Espín-Sánchez